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Defense policy encourages the use of competition in defense procurement, especially
for relatively simple technologies. A number of recent papers have raised questions
about the value of dual sourcing, since it sacri¯ces scale economies, reduces the number
of units over which each producer's learning occurs, and may induce collusion unless
the bidders are unsure of each other's costs, e.g. for sophisticated technologies in the
early phases of production. I explore the e®ects of dual sourcing using a panel dataset
comprising 14 missile systems with an average of 12.5 years of production history per
system. Each missile's complexity is categorized based on the nature of its guidance and
control system. Consistent with theory, dual sourcing is used more often in innovation-
intensive settings, in early periods of production, and after the incumbent producer
demonstrates quality control problems. Nevertheless, the empirical results indicate
that dual sourcing does not reduce government procurement costs.
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Procurement of high-technology equipment presents an enormously challenging contracting
problem. Relatively small production volumes for specialized products often lead to a situ-
ation of bilateral monopoly. The nature of future innovations cannot be precisely speci¯ed
in advance, so contracts are inherently incomplete, and often experience substantial rene-
gotiation over time.1 Not surprisingly, high acquisition costs periodically prompt public
outcry.
One response to these challenges has been an increased reliance on competition in
the procurement process. Defense program managers are \required by law and regula-
tion to incorporate e®ective competition in the acquisition of weapon systems, whenever
practicable."2 This is typically accomplished through a bidding competition that splits pro-
duction between two di®erent ¯rms, a practice known as a \split-award auction" or \dual
sourcing." (The term \second sourcing" is used when the incumbent producer is ousted
upon poor performance and replaced by an entrant.) Recent consolidations in the defense
industry, however, have shrunk the number of competing ¯rms, raising concerns about
maintaining adequate competition in the procurement process.3
The conventional wisdom about the bene¯ts of competition has been called into ques-
tion by recent theoretical work, which is generally rather pessimistic about the potential
for competition to improve procurement practices.4 The fundamental problem is that com-
petition at the production stage tends to undermine incentives for investment at the R&D
stage. These incentive e®ects are very di±cult to identify empirically, so most empirical
work has focused on savings at the production stage. Yet while numerous consultants have
performed empirical analyses of production savings from dual sourcing, these studies were
not grounded in economic theory, and have been roundly criticized by academics for their
statistical shortcomings.5
1Crocker and Reynolds[7] provide an empirical analysis of contractual incompleteness in defense
procurement.
2Kratz, Drinnon and Hiller[11], p. 1-7. These authors, in their handbook for defense program man-
agers, identify a number of speci¯c legislative and regulatory requirements for the use of competition in
procurement.
3Kovacic and Smallwood[10] provide a good survey of the issues raised by defense consolidation. The
work of Cooper et al.[6] re°ects the Defense Department's growing concern over the dwindling number of
competitors in the defense industry.
4For example, Riordan and Sappington[13, p. 56] state that \Our principal conclusion is that second
sourcing will often be undesirable, except possibly in special cases when the technology-transfer cost is
of intermediate magnitude." Similarly, La®ont and Tirole[12, Ch. 8, p. 359] note that \We arrived at
a relatively pessimistic assessment of the virtues of second sourcing...when substantial investments are at
stake."
5Anton and Yao[3] critique these studies in detail. I discuss their criticisms in section 2 below.
1Conventional views about the types of systems that might bene¯t from dual sourcing are
also being challenged. For example, the Defense Systems Management College, in a hand-
book for defense program managers, states that \If the technology employed in the system
is pushing the state-of-the-art, technology transfer is di±cult to e®ect and production com-
petition is di±cult to establish."6 Anton and Yao[1, p. 700], in contrast, use auction theory
to argue that \In a stable technological environment where long-time competitors arelikely
to have good information about a competitor's costs, [bidding] coordination may be easy
to achieve, and split award auctions will perform poorly from the viewpoint of the buyer.
However, when innovation is a key competitive dimension, uncertainty introduced by the
innovative process makes coordination in split award auctions more di±cult and increases
the attractiveness of a split award auction format to the buyer." In sum, our empirical
knowledge of the circumstances under which procurement competition is valuable is very
limited.
This paper uses a unique panel dataset to explore the performance of production com-
petition in the procurement process. I analyze the price performance of a set of 14 tactical
missiles, in production for an average of 12.5 years apiece; roughly 27% of the production
years involve dual sourcing. Interesting results emerge in two areas: 1) the e®ects of dual
sourcing on procurement costs, and 2) the conditions under which dual sourcing is used.
In the ¯rst area, I ¯nd that contractor performance shows strong evidence of learning-by-
doing as well as economies of scale. Dual sourcing, however, has no statistically signi¯cant
e®ects on either of these dimensions; apparently the cost-reduction incentives created by
competition just o®set the loss of learning and scale economies. The conventional wisdom
that dual sourcing reduces procurement costs does not appear to be true in practice. In
the second area, I ¯nd that dual sourcing is used more often for complex technologies, for
systems that undergo major design modi¯cations, and in early periods of production|that
is, in circumstances when bidding collusion is less likely. Non-price concerns are also im-
portant: dual sourcing is used more often after the incumbent experiences quality control
problems. Finally, dual sourcing is used less often for systems procured under multiyear
contracts, suggesting that competition and contractual completeness may be substitutes in
the buyer's contracting toolkit. From a policy perspective, these ¯ndings suggest that dual
sourcing policy should be driven, not by attempts to save money, but by non-price con-
siderations such as providing incentives for product quality and maintaining an adequate
defense industrial base.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant
theoretical and empirical issues from the literature. Section 3 presents the basic model I
6Kratz, Drinnon and Hiller[11], p. 3-5.
2estimate, while section 4 describes the data used. Empirical results are presented in section
5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Issues
Previous work, both theoretical and empirical, helps frame the issues to be investigated in
this paper. This section brie°y reviews the main insights emerging from the literature.
2.1 Theory
A relatively small theoretical literatureon second sourcing hasemerged in recent years, most
of which focuseson thepossibility of ousting theincumbent and replacing it with arival ¯rm
if incumbent performanceisunsatisfactory. ThisliteratureincludesthemodelsofAnton and
Yao[2], Demski, Sappington and Spiller[8], La®ont and Tirole[12, Chapter 8], and Riordan
and Sappington[13]. As mentioned above, thesemodelsaregenerally quitepessimisticabout
the potential for second sourcing to improve procurement performance, due to the tension
between reducing production stage rents and maintaining R&D investment. Unfortunately,
the literature provides little guidance for an empirical analysis of dual sourcing (i.e. the
splitting of production volumes between two producers), sincemost papers do not allow for
the possibility that two producers will be used simultaneously; in the typical model, if the
second source iscalled into action then it takes over theentireproduction of theincumbent.
Anton and Yao[1] do o®er a model of true dual sourcing (which they refer to as \split-
award" auctions), but it lacks the intertemporal detail of some of the other papers cited
above. Thus, thereis no complete theory of dual sourcing upon which to draw for empirical
purposes; nor do I attempt to produceonehere. Instead, I review several theoretical papers
of most relevance to this project, highlighting their testable implications and the points
where modeling assumptions are at odds with the realities of defense procurement.
Beforeturning in moredetail to papers directly related to dual sourcing or second sourc-
ing, it is important to highlight two key elements of the defense contracting environment.
First, the buyer's valuation of defense equipment is highly dependent on its quality,7 yet it
is extremely di±cult to write complete contingent contracts that specify all dimensions of
quality for new products whose development is still underway. Second, it is very di±cult
for the government to commit to not renegotiate procurement contracts. Congressional
budgets are passed on a year-to-year basis, making multiyear contracting very di±cult for
the Department of Defense. The combination of non-contractible quality and renegotiation
7The seller's investment in qualityenhancement is thus a \cooperative" investment that raises the buyer's
value, rather than a \sel¯sh" investment that reduces the seller's cost. Che and Hausch[5] explore the
di±culties of contracting when cooperative investments are involved.
3renders contracts of limited value. Indeed, Che and Hausch[5] show that in such cases there
is often no value at all in writing a long-term contract, thereby rationalizing the severe
incompleteness observed in many defense procurement contracts.8
The initial theoretical papers on dual sourcing ignored issues of quality-increasing in-
vestment, and focused on the use of second-sourcing as a way to reduce the information
rent of an incumbent producer with an informational advantage over the regulator.9 For
example, Anton and Yao[2] explicitly model the learning curve, which is a very important
factor in defense procurement practice. They assume the incumbent producer knows a key
parameter regarding the learning curve which is unknown to the government or to other
producers. In these types of settings, a second source is more likely to be used the higher
is the incumbent's initial price (or cost report).
Riordan and Sappington[13] present a model that incorporates non-contractible invest-
ment in quality on the part of the seller and lack of commitment power on the part of the
buyer. They do not directly analyze dual sourcing, but they do provide a rationale for its
use, as will be discussed shortly. These authors consider a model with both an R&D stage
and a production stage. The government can commit to whether or not it will allow a
second source to compete in the production stage with the ¯rm that wins the R&D stage,
but it cannot specify in a contract the desired level of quality or investment. After the
R&D stage, the government has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the ¯rm.
The ¯rms have private information about the cost of production. As a result, under sole
sourcing ¯rms have strong incentives to invest in R&D, since they are assured of earning
information rents at theproduction stage. A winner-take-all competition at the production
stage reduces information rents, but as a result it also reduces incentives for R&D. Riordan
and Sappington show that the latter e®ect often dominates the former, so that the buyer
prefers sole sourcing. Riordan and Sappington speculate that splitting production between
thetwo sources may allow the buyer to ¯netune theprocurement process and obtain better
results than if second sourcing must be an all-or-nothing choice. The reason is that dual
sourcing does not threaten to extract all of the ¯rm's information rents, so does not have
such a dampening e®ect on R&D. Although the authorsdo not mention it, it is also possible
that if the ¯rms must continue investing in R&D during the production phase, they will
undertakemore R&D under the competitive pressures of dual sourcing.10 Theauthors' key
testable result is that the optimal policy for the government is to observe the(unveri¯able)
8See Crocker and Reynolds[4] for details on the structure of defense procurement contracts.
9See Anton and Yao[2], and Demski, Sappington and Spiller[8].
10Several other important facets of the procurement process are ignored: the ¯rms cannot exert e®ort
to reduce their costs, there is no learning by doing, the incumbent ¯rm has no bargaining power, there is
perfect bidding parity between the incumbent and a new entrant at the beginning of the production stage.
4quality of a newly developed product, and then select the incumbent developer to produce
the product if quality is high (i.e., above a certain threshold), but to oust the incumbent
and replace him with a second supplier if quality is low.
Anton and Yao[1] o®er a formal analysis of dual sourcing that provides more insight
into its use. They develop an auction model in which two bidders each present the buyer
with a schedule of bids corresponding to various possible splits of production between the
two ¯rms. Anton and Yao show that dual sourcing performs poorly if the bidders have
full information about each others' costs, since in this case they have powerful incentives
to tacitly coordinate their bids so as to achieve the monopoly price. With asymmetric
information, however, dual sourcing can lead to a Pareto improvement relativeto a winner-
take-all auction. Theempirical implication is that dual sourcing is morelikely to bevaluable
to the buyer in innovation-intensive settings of substantial technological complexity, where
the bidders know less about each others' costs and cannot readily coordinate their bids.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this view is sharply at odds with conventional wisdom
regarding when dual sourcing is likely to be valuable.
A third rationale for the use of dual sourcing is suggested by Crocker and Reynolds'[7]
empirical study of Air Force engine procurement contracts. They ¯nd that procurement
contracts tend to be less complete in a dual sourcing environment, and argue that this is
sensible because the presence of alternative suppliers reduces the potential for contractor
opportunism. With less concern about opportunism, the buyer can economize on the costs
of writing more completecontracts. A complementary interpretation, not mentioned by the
authors, is that dual sourcing is particularly valuable in the early stages of development
and production, when technological uncertainties make complete contracting particularly
di±cult. Dual sourcing may then serveto disciplinecontractors when doing so contractually
is simply not feasible.
The literature, then, o®ers several hypotheses about the use of dual sourcing:
1. Dual sourcing is more likely to reduce procurement costs when used for complex
technologies.
2. Dual sourcing is more likely to be used after the incumbent charges a high price.
3. Dual sourcing is morelikely to beused aftertheincumbent producer deliversproducts
with quality defects.
4. Dual sourcing is more likely to be used for complex technologies than for simpleones.
5. Dual sourcing is more likely to be used in the early stages of production.
52.2 Empirical Challenges
Not surprisingly, theDepartment of Defense has long been interested in therole of competi-
tion in the procurement process, and has sponsored a number of empirical studies to assess
the e®ects of dual sourcing on price competition. Anton and Yao (1990) review nine such
analyses. The general conclusions from this work are: 1) The sole-source contract price
declines over time; 2) It is unclear whether the learning curve is steeper under competition;
3) When there is a switch from sole-sourcing to dual-sourcing, the ¯rst competitive price is
generally below the last sole-source price; 4) Electronics programs bene¯t more from com-
petition than other programs, e.g. missiles or torpedoes/bombs; and 5) The second source
won most of the winner-take-all competitions, but experienced (quality) problems in the
post-competitive phase. All but one of the studies found that competition reduced costs.
Anton and Yao are generally quite critical of these empirical studies, for a variety of
reasons. Some studies make obvious errors such as failing to incorporate learning e®ects,
scale economies, and/or in°ation. Almost all of the studies work with price data rather
than cost data, so they must implicitly assume price is simply cost plus some proportional
markup. Most of thestudies estimate learning e®ects foreach program separately, and thus
lack enough data points to test interesting hypotheses. Some studies fail to include data for
sole-sourceperiodsprior to dual sourcing. All but oneof thestudiesfail to analyzeprograms
that only used sole-sourcing. As a result the samples may be biased because the choice to
go to dual sourcing may be conditioned upon high costs by the initial producer. In fact,
this concern is supported by the fact that the second source won ensuing winner-take-all
competitions in 16 of 17 cases.
In light of all the foregoing °aws, Anton and Yao make some suggestions for future
empirical work. These include: 1) Pool time series data overmultiple programs to allow for
hypothesis tests; 2) Include both sole-source and dual-source programs; 3) Recognize that
the savings from competition depend upon both sources having lowered costs to roughly
the same degree, since otherwise the low-cost ¯rm will bid to just undercut the high-cost
¯rm's price; and 4) Recognize that incentives for cost-reduction during the competitive
phase depend on the expected form of future bidding competitions, e.g. split-award vs.
winner-take-all.
The empirical work of Crocker and Reynolds[7] postdates the survey of Anton and
Yao[3]. Their focus is also di®erent, since they are oriented not toward price competition,
but rather toward understanding the degree of incompleteness observed in various contrac-
tual environments. Nevertheless, their work suggests that it may be interesting to study
interaction e®ects between the use of dual sourcing and the completeness of procurement
contracts.
62.3 Implications of Previous Work
The research summarized above has several important implications for this paper. First,
technological complexity (and the attendant asymmetric information across rival ¯rms)
has important e®ects on the performance of dual sourcing, and should be controlled for
empirically. Second, interaction e®ectsbetween contractual completenessand theuseofdual
sourcing should o®er additional insight into the importance of complexity and uncertainty
in procurement management. Third, the use of panel data on a set of related procurement
programs over timeshould allow for improvements over previous empirical work. Fourth, it
is important to avoid selection bias by including both missiles with and without periods of
dual sourcing. Fifth, to assess the performance of dual sourcing, it is important to separate
winner-take-all auctions from split-award auctions, and to control for the priorexperienceof
theincumbent when estimating thebene¯tsof dual sourcing. Finally, analysisof production
costs provides an incomplete basis for policy decisions. It is also necessary to examine how
alternative forms of production competition a®ect incentives for investment in R&D. While
R&D investment is beyond the scope of the present paper, it must be kept in mind when
evaluating the empirical results. Thesesix implications all ¯gureimportantly in theanalysis
to follow.
3 The Model
Both the consequences and the causes of dual sourcing are of interest. This section presents
the empirical models I used for estimating these issues.
3.1 Price E®ects of Dual Sourcing
I model the sellers' price performance according to the equation
Yit =®i+(¯ +°Dit+¿Wit)Xit +²it; (1)
where Yit is the unit \°yaway" cost for the ith system in year t, ®i is a system-speci¯c
¯xed e®ect, Xit is a set of independent variables, Dit is a dummy variable that captures the
decision to use dual sources (a split award auction), Wit is a dummy variable that captures
the decision to use a winner-take-all auction rather than a split-award auction, and ²it is
an error term.
The structure of the model emphasizes the possibility that dual sourcing changes the
relationship between theindependent variables in X and °yaway costs Y . Given theimpor-
tance of learning-by-doing and scaleeconomiesin producing sophisticated weapons systems,
7themost important of these shifts are likely to be with respect to these two variables. I use
the following functional form, standard in the literature estimating learning e®ects:
FLY AWAYit = eaitCUMQb1
itQTY b2
it (2)
where FLY AWAYit is the per unit \°yaway" cost of system i in period t, CUMQit repre-
sents cumulative production of system i through period t, and QTYit is current production
of system i in period t alone. Foreconometricpurposes thisis normally estimated by taking
natural logarithms on both sides of the equation to obtain
LNFLYit = ait +b1LNCUMQit +b2LNQTYit: (3)
The coe±cients in equation (3) are assumed to have the following structure:
ait = ®i +±1DESGNDUMit +±2MULTIDUMit (4)
b1 =¯1 +°1DUALDUMit +´1WTADUMit +¿1COMPLEXi (5)
b2 =¯2 +°2DUALDUMit +´2WTADUMit +¿2COMPLEXi (6)
where DESGNDUMit is a dummy variable indicating whether a major design change
was implemented for system i in period t, MULTIDUMit is a dummy variable indicating
whether a multiyear contract was in use forsystem i in period t, DUALDUMit is a dummy
variableindicatingwhetherdual sourcing wasused forsystemi in period t, and WTADUMit
is a dummy variable indicating whether a winner-take-all competition was held for system
i in a period t subsequent to a previous phase of dual sourcing.
My analysis departs from the previous empirical literature both in terms of its explicit
focus on hypotheses from the theoretical literature and in its use of panel data. As noted
above, most previous studies treat each system separately, thus reducing the number of
datapoints for each regression to the point where testing hypotheses about dual sourcing
becomes di±cult if not impossible. Thebiggest assumption involved in pooling the systems
into a single panel is that the model in equations (1) through (6) is actually the \true"
model, so that variations in the coe±cients b1 and b2 are explained by dual sourcing, but
not by factors such as technological complexity. I test speci¯cally for whether technological
complexity a®ects the slope of the learning curve in section 5.2 below.
83.2 Factors Prompting the Use of Dual Sourcing
Because the dual sourcing decision is made prior to the observation of price performance,
DUALDUMit can be treated as a pre-determined variable. Nevertheless, it is of some
interest to probe the factors that induce the government to use dual sourcing for particular
missiles. I thus estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable DUALDUM
represents the binary choice between sole sourcing and dual sourcing (with values 0 and 1,
respectively).11 My fundamental prediction is that, if the di®erence in expected bene¯ts to
the government between dual sourcing and sole sourcing is positive, then the government
will use dual sourcing to procure a given missile system. More precisely, I are interested in
the relationship
¢it = µ0Zit +¹it; (7)
where¢it isthenet bene¯t of using dual sourcing instead of solesourcing, forthe ith missile
and the tth period, µ is a vector of coe±cients, Zij is a matrix of independent variables,
and ¹ij is an error term assumed to be IN(0;1). Of course, the econometrician cannot
observe ¢ij directly. Instead I observe only the discrete choice between sole sourcing and





1 if ¢it >0
0 otherwise:
(8)
It is this variable that I estimate with the probit. More speci¯cally, I estimate theequation
DUALDUMit = µ1LNCUMQit+µ2LNQTYit +µ3DESGNDUMit
+µ4MULTIDUMit +µ5FLYRATLGit +µ6NUMBIDt +µ7PERIODit
+µ8FY Rit +µ9COMPLEXi +µ10LENGTHi
+µ11QTOGOit +µ12PROBLEMSit +¹it (9)
where NUMBIDt is the number of potential bidders to produce a system in period t,
PERIODit ´ t indicates that system i is in its tth year of production, FYRit is the ¯scal
year when system i was in its tth period of production, COMPLEXi is a dummy vari-
able indicating whether a particular system is technologically complex or not, LENGTHi
indicates the total number of periods of production for system i over its production life,
QTOGOit isthe number of unitsof system i that will beproduced overthe remainder of its
production life, FLYRATLGit is the ratio of system i's °yaway costs in period t¡1 to its
11In this estimation I consider only the choice between sole sourcing anddual sourcing. As described below,
I conducted a separate estimation for the choice between dual sourcing and a winner-takes-all auction.
9°yaway costs in period 1, and CUMPROBit is thecumulative number of quality assurance
problems experienced by missile i through period t.
The motivation for selecting these particular variables comes largely from the conven-
tional wisdom about when dual sourcing is likely to be e±cacious. The monograph Estab-
lishing Competitive Production Sources: A Handbook for Program Managers, published by
theDefenseSystems Management College, provides a list of variables that form a \Prelimi-
nary Screen of Programs for Competition," indicating that dual sourcing is more promising
when: total quantity (captured by the variable QTOGOit) is larger; production duration
(captured by LENGTHi) is greater; the progress curve (captured by FLY RATLGit) is
°atter; the technical complexity (captured by COMPLEXi) is more modest; and contract
complexity (captured by MULTIDUMit, which also serves as an independent variable in
estimating °yaway costs) is more modest. In addition, I include a measure of the number
of potential bidders who have the technological capability to serve as a second source,12
NUMBIDt, reasoning that dual sourcing is more likely when the number of alternative
bidders is greater. A moredetailed description of thesevariables follows in thenext section.
4 Data Description
Unless stated otherwise, the missile data are from the Defense Department's Selected Ac-
quisition Reports (SAR). The variables used and summary statistics are presented in Table
1. Fourteen di®erent missile systems were examined. The total number of observations
(system-periods) is 175, so the average number of periods/system is 12.5 years. The num-
ber of system-periods of sole source procurement was 107, the number of system-periods of
dual sourcing was 55, and of winner-take-all auctions was 13. The number of periods under
multiyear contract was nine; Stinger was under a multiyear contract from 1988-1991, and
Patriot from 1987-1991.13 Two of the missiles (Tomahawk and Stinger) experienced major
design changes during the production period.14 The number of potential bidders was 2 in
1975, and was between 4 and 8 in all other years.15
As described in section 3, the dependent variable on which the analysis focuses is \°y-
away costs" per missile, i.e. procurement prices to the government. The two basic produc-
tion variables that drive costsarecumulativeproduction (to track learning e®ects) and scale
12See Cooper et al.[6] for details on this variable.
13Before Defense Department procurement o±cials can enter into a multiyearcontract, theymust somehow
establish that the multiyear contract will produce savings of at leastthe Congressionally mandated minimum
level of 15%. See Cooper et al.[6], p. v.
14Detailed descriptions of the missile systems can be found in Cooper et al.[6].
15The number of bidders was determined through the combined judgments of several experts familiar with
the missile industry. More details are available in Cooper et al.[6].
10(to track scale economies). Cumulative production was measured using the \lot midpoint"
foreach year. Thisis thequantity at which learning e®ects would beprecisely equal to their
average over the entire production lot for that year. The natural logarithm of the cost and
production data was employed to simplify the estimation process. A plot of the natural log
of °yaway costs vs. the natural log of cumulative production is presented in Figure 1 for
the sample as a whole, with each datapoint identi¯ed by an abbreviation for the missile's
name. The individual graphs for each missile separately are presented in Figure 2. Note
that the production quantities include both U.S. and foreign missile sales.
Variable De¯nition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LNFLY Log of Unit Cost -0.978 1.576 -4.300 1.770
LNCUMQ Log of Cumulative 8.144 1.858 3.757 12.337
Production Quantity
LNQTY Log of Current 6.742 1.522 1.792 10.212
Production Quantity
DESGNDUM Dummy Variable = 1 0.079 0.270 0 1
if Major Redesign
MULTIDUM Dummy Variable = 1 0.051 0.222 0 1
if Multiyear Contract Used
DUALDUM Dummy Variable = 1 0.3143 0.466 0 1
if Dual Sourcing Used
WTADUM Dummy Variable = 1 0.08 0.272 0 1
if Winner-Take-All Auction
Used After Dual Sourcing
NUMBID Number of Potential Bidders 6.890 1.193 2 8
COMPLEX Dummy Variable = 1 0.5 0.501 0 1
if Technology is Complex
LENGTH Years of Procurement 12.5 3.627 7 20
FYR Fiscal Year 1986.173 4.607 1975 1995
PERIOD Period of Production 10.5 5.777 1 20
QTOGO Total Future Production 9777.868 27108.06 0 225639
FLYRATLG Ratio of Previous Period's Cost 0.397 0.269 0.054 1.046
to Initial Period Cost
PROBLEMS Cumulative Problems Noted in AW&ST 2.189 3.253 0 14
Table 1: Summary Statistics
11Technological complexity plays an important role in theanalysis, particularly that of the
missiles' guidance and control systems. The simplest missile in the dataset is theTOW 2, a
vehicle-mounted anti-tank missile guided by an operator who keeps the target centered in a
telescopic sight. Moving the sight sends electronic signals through two wires to the missile
to correct its °ight. At the other extreme are PATRIOT and Tomahawk, \¯re-and-forget"
missiles with highly sophisticated guidance and control systems that pushed the state of
the art when they were ¯elded.16 The complexity of the guidance and control system of
each missile is described in Table 2.
System Type Guidance Complexity
Patriot Surface-to-air Track-via-missile Complex
Tomahawk Surface-to-surface, Inertial navigation, TERCOM Complex
submarine-to-surface updates, digital scene matching
AMRAAM Air-to-air Active radar Complex
Harpoon Air-to-surface, Active radar, attitude Complex
surface-to-surface, reference assembly
submarine-to-surface
Phoenix Air-to-air Semi-active radar in midcourse; Complex
active radar in terminal phase
Standard Missile 2 Surface-to-air Semi-active radar Complex
Sparrow AIM/RIM-7M Air-to-air, surface-to-air, Semi-active radar Complex
surface-to-surface
ATACMS Surface-to-surface Ring laser gyro Simple
HARM Air-to-ground Radio frequency homing Simple
I2R Maverick Air-to-surface Infrared homing Simple
Hell¯re Air-to-ground Semi-active laser seeking Simple
Sidewinder AIM-9M Air-to-air Infrared homing Simple
Stinger Surface-to-air Infrared homing Simple
TOW2 Surface-to-surface Wire guided Simple
Table 2: Technological Characteristics of Missile Systems
The key policy variable for this analysis is the decision regarding how many producers
to use. Table 3 provides a history for all the missiles, showing all periods for which SAR
data were available, and indicating for each missile in each year whether production was
sole-sourced or dual-sourced. In some cases, it was necessary to make judgement calls
regarding when the transition to dual sourcing began. Take thecaseof the Phoenix missile,
for example, as described by Cooper et al.[6, pp. 2-13 and 2-14]. Hughes Aircraft began
16See Cooper et al., chapter 4, for further description of each missile's technological complexity.
12production asthesolesourcein 1980, and enjoyed a monopoly position forsix years. In 1986,
Raytheon obtained a contract to produce 10 \learning units," in 1987 Raytheon produced
56 \quali¯cation units," and in 1988 Raytheon built 180 units under a \directed contract."
Finally, in 1989, Raytheon competed in a split-award auction against Hughes. I havechosen
toclassify theyears1986-1988 as dual sourced. On onehand, this isproblematic, since there
was no formal split-award auction and thus no chance for bidding collusion. On the other
hand, classifying these years as sole sourced would arguably be worse, since Hughes was
e®ectively on noticethat it faced competition and could nolonger takeits monopoly position
forgranted. Note that several missiles shift to a \winner-take-all" bidding competition after
a period of split award auctions, with the playing ¯eld presumably leveled during theperiod
of dual sourcing. Thedummy variable \WTADUM" indicates these periods of winner-take-
all competition after dual sourcing.17




1978 Sole Sole Sole
1979 Sole Sole Sole
1980 Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole
1981 Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole
1982 Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole Dual Sole Sole Sole Dual Sole
1983 Sole Sole Sole Dual Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole
1984 Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole Sole Sole Sole Sole
1985 Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole
1986 Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Dual Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole
1987 Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole Dual Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole
1988 Dual Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Dual Dual Dual Sole Sole Dual Sole
1989 Dual Sole Sole Sole Dual Dual Sole Dual Dual Dual Sole Dual Sole
1990 Dual Sole Sole Sole WTA WTA Sole WTA Dual Dual Dual Sole
1991 Dual Sole Sole Sole WTA WTA Sole Dual WTA Dual Sole
1992 Dual Sole Sole WTA Dual Dual Sole
1993 Dual Sole Sole WTA Dual WTA Dual Sole
1994 Dual Sole WTA Dual WTA
1995 Dual Sole WTA Sole WTA
Table 3: Production Runs and Sourcing of Missile Systems
Quality control problems are a potentially important factor a®ecting the decision to
utilize dual sourcing. I proxied for this variable by performing a search of LEXIS/NEXIS
by missile, using the keywords \problem," \delays," \defects," and \malfunction." I found a
total of 43 stories reporting the use of oneormore of theseterms for a missile in my sample.
Table 4 summarizes this data for complex and simple missiles separately. Interestingly,
complex missiles aremorethan threetimes as likely to su®er quality control problems than
are simple missiles. Five missile systems accounted for 88/
17A remarkably careful reader might note that there are only 174 entries in Table 3, while the text states
there are 175 observations. The reason isthat the Harpoon data include an \extra" period with date \FY7T"
between \FY76" and \FY77."
13Complex Simple
Number of Reported Problems 35 (21) 8
Number of Observations 96 (87) 79
Problems/System-Year 0.36 (.24) 0.10
Table 4: Reported Quality Control Problems for Complex and Simple Missiles
(Results excluding AMRAAM in parentheses)
5 Empirical Results
I begin by testing whetherdual sourcing lowers procurement costs, and then turn to analysis
of the government's decision regarding when to use dual-sourcing.
5.1 Price Improvement under Dual Sourcing
The government's decision to use dual sourcing for a given missile in a given year is always
made before that year's production is begun. Thus, the dual sourcing dummy is a prede-
termined variable and can be treated as exogenous in a regression. Note that estimation of
equation (3) requires the construction of variables that re°ect multiplicative interaction be-
tween DUALDUM, WTA, COMPLEX and LNCUMQ and LNQTY . These variables
have the names DUALCUMQ, DUALQTY , etc. Table 5 presents estimates of °yaway
costs.
14Table 5: Estimated Flyaway Costs with Missile Fixed E®ects
Variable (1) (2) (3)
LNCUMQ -.2287a -.2491a -.2393a
(-7.602) (-7.896) (-7.661)
LNQTY -.3219a -.2925a -.2568a
(-6.054) (-5.527) (-5.700)
DESGNDUM .5405a .8214a .1846
(5.280) (6.298) (1.270)
MULTIDUM -.2999a -.1953 -.4861a
(-2.991) (-1.380) (-3.613)
DUALCUMQ .0028 -.0402 -.0638
(.065) (-.514) (-1.265)
DUALQTY -.0103 .0127 .0896
(-.192) (.141) (1.379)
WTACUMQ .0498 .1303c -.2684
(.725) (1.902) (-1.223)






Adjusted R-squared .9791 .9712 .94047
F value 354.82 188.96 108.20
Number of observations 175 79 96
a Signi¯cant beyond the 1% level
b Signi¯cant beyond the 5% level
c Signi¯cant beyond the 10% level
The results indicate that both learning and scale economies are very important deter-
minants (statistically and economically) of a missile system's price to the government. The
\slope" of the learning curve is -.229, meaning that a doubling of cumulative output causes
unit price to fall by 22.9%. Similarly, scaleeconomies areevident in that a doubling of per-
period production reduces unit price by 32.2%. Interestingly, complex and simple missiles
do not di®er signi¯cantly in either the steepness of the learning curve or the extent of scale
15economies; the coe±cients on COMPCUMQ and COMPQTY are small in magnitude
and nowhere near statistical signi¯cance.
Majordesign changes causesubstantial and statistically signi¯cant increases in procure-
ment prices, as is to be expected. The coe±cient on DESGNDUM is .5405, so a major
design change raises unit °yaway cost by a factor of exp :5405 =1:7169, meaning that costs
rise by 72%. Multiyear contracting, on the other hand, reduces °yaway costs by a factor
of exp¡:2999 =:7409, implying that costs fall by 25.91%. This level exceeds the Congres-
sionally mandated minimum of 15% savings from a multiyear contract, and suggests that
the typical lack of commitment power on the part of Department of Defense procurement
o±cials imposes signi¯cant costs on the procurement process.
Dual sourcing does not appear to have signi¯cant e®ects on unit procurement prices.
Neithertheslopeof thelearning curvenortheextent of scaleeconomieschangessigni¯cantly
when dual sourcing is introduced, i.e. neither DUALCUMQ nor DUALQTY are signi¯-
cant at even the80% level. These results °y in the faceof most prior studies, which tend to
conclude that dual sourcing reduces procurement costs. There are several possible expla-
nations. First, it is important to recognize that my data include both recurring (variable)
and non-recurring (¯xed) costs, unlike some previous studies. Thus, while dual sourcing
might stimulate greater cost-cutting e®ort and thus reduce recurring costs, the transfer of
technology to a second source raises non-recurring costs; my results indicate that these two
e®ects essentially cancel one another out. Similarly, greater competition might stimulate
a more rapid descent of the learning curve, but with production split between two ¯rms
each ¯rm's cumulative production will grow slower. Again, the two e®ects work against
one another. Splitting production also causes each ¯rm to sacri¯ce scale economies, but
again this could be o®set by the e®ects of greater competition. In theend, according to the
data, the net e®ect of all these factors is a wash. Dual sourcing, normally billed as a way
to reduce procurement costs, does not appear to save the government money, at least not
in my panel of missile data.
Finally, I consider the impact of holding a winner-takes-all competition after a number
of periods of dual sourcing. This could potentially be a useful procurement tool if the
period of dual sourcing allows the second source to descend the learning curve to the point
where it is cost-competitive with the incumbent, and then the winner-takes-all competition
produces particularly intensebidding behavior. The data do not o®er much support forthis
hypothesis, however, as neither POSTCUMQ nor POSTQTY are statistically signi¯cant.
The coe±cients are of the expected signs, with the move to a winner-takes-all competition
slowing the rate of learning but o®ering some gains in terms of economies of scale.
Regressions(2) and (3) present resultsforthesubsamplesof simpleand complex missiles,
respectively. Turning ¯rst to the simple missiles, the general pattern of results is quite
16similar to that in estimation (1). The magnitude of learning and scale e®ects is very
close to that for the pooled sample. Major design changes appear to have an even greater
impact on the costs of simple missiles, raising unit prices to the government by 127%.
Multiyear contracting, in contrast, is somewhat less useful for simple missiles, producing
a price reduction of about 18%. Once again, dual sourcing has no signi¯cant impacts on
learning or scale economies. The shift to a winner-takes-all auction after a phase of dual
sourcing does have signi¯cant e®ects for simple missiles, with the learning curve °attening
somewhat while capacity utilization (and hence scale economies) improve.
Estimation (3), which considers only the complex missiles, is again quite similar to the
earlier results. Learning and scale e®ects do not change greatly, and dual sourcing remains
a statistically insigni¯cant factor. The magnitude of the coe±cients of DUALCUMQ and
DUALQTY are considerably higher for complex than for simple missiles, however, and so
are the signi¯cance levels; nevertheless, these variables are still only signi¯cant at the 21%
and 17% levels, respectively.18 The use of winner-takes-all competition has no signi¯cant
e®ect on the priceof complex missilesystems. Major design changes also haveno signi¯cant
impacts for complex missiles, which is consistent with thenotion that complex technologies
require an ongoing set of modi¯cations even without such design adjustments. Multiyear
contracting, however, appears especially valuable for complex missiles, producing a 48.5%
price reduction.
None of the above results support the use of dual sourcing as a way to cut procure-
ment costs.19 This may be viewed as disappointing, given the expectations created by
pronouncements from members of Congress and from o±cials in the armed forces. From
another perspective, however, the insigni¯cant e®ect of dual sourcing on procurement costs
can beseen as comforting. If the government uses dual sourcing for reasons other than cost
savings, such as disciplining contractors who produce poor quality missiles or maintaining
a broad base of potential suppliers, then these bene¯ts appear to be achievable at little or
no extra cost to taxpayers. The next section turns to an examination of the factors that
determine when the government elects to use dual sourcing.
18Since these coe±cients are not too far from conventional measures of signi¯cance, I performed a simple
numerical simulation to determine how many periods of dual sourcing wouldbe required to produce economic
savings to the government. At the average annual production quantity for a complex missile (403.4), twelve
years of dual sourcing would be required before the bene¯ts of a steeper learning curve would outweigh the
costs of lost scale economies.
19The only (weak) evidence supporting the value of dual sourcing is that if the dual-sourcing coe±cients
for simple missiles were non-zero (there is at least a 60% chance they are zero), they would indicate that
dual sourcing produces savings for simple missiles from the ¯rst period onwards. This is because there is
little loss of scale economies for the simple missiles.
175.2 The Dual-Sourcing Decision
This section explores the determinants of the government's decision to use dual-sourcing
for a particular missile in a particular year. Because transitions from one sourcing mode to
another occur in an ordered sequence from sole sourcing to dual sourcing to winner takes
all, I proceed in two steps. First, I consider the government's choice between sole and dual
sourcing, excluding from the analysis all winner-take-all auctions. Second, I consider the
government's choice between dual sourcing and winner takes all, excluding all observations
of sole sourcing.
Table 6 presents the results of a probit analysis of the dual-sourcing dummy variable
DUALDUM, when all observations of winner-take-all auctions are excluded from analysis.
Estimation (1) considers the entire sample of missiles; estimation (2) considers only the
transitions from sole sourcing, i.e. it excludes all observations which follow a period of dual
sourcing, and estimation (3) considers only the subsample of missiles that switched from
sole to dual sourcing at some point during the history of production.
18Table 6: Probit Analysis of the Dual-Sourcing Decision
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Flyratlg -0.4613 1.0223 1.7690
(-.523) (.727) (1.234)
Problems 0:2675a .2994c .1927
(3.311) (1.802) (1.362)
Complex :8383c :8203 1.0728
(1.691) (.990) (1.505)
Period ¡0:4895a -0.8534b -.1702
(-2.989) (-2.395) (-1.138)
FYR .1972b 0.2663 .1682
(2.054) (1.421) (1.134)
Lncumq 1.2795a 1.3830b .7473
(3.167) (2.043) (1.180)
Lnqty -.3837 -.00004 -.1990
(-1.066) (.000) (-.578)
Desgndum :7529 1.1310 -.3789
(1.585) (1.272) (-.834)
Multidum ¡1:1323c .5183 .0750
(-1.691) (.624) (.081)
Numbid 0:1882 0:5467 .5867a
(1.042) (1.496) (2.616)
Length :1387 .3659c .0691
(1.322) (1.771) (.566)
QTOGO ¡0:00005a -.00008c .00001
(-2.865) (-1.783) (.230)
Constant -399.7563 -544.7112 -344.6623
(-2.079) (-1.452) (-1.173)
Number of observations 148 101 95
L-R Statistic 82.4188 18.8092 31.1727
a Signi¯cant beyond the 1% level
b Signi¯cant beyond the 5% level
c Signi¯cant beyond the 10% level
The overall predictive power of the estimations is summarized in Tables 7-9, which
19compare the predicted and actual values of the dual sourcing dummy. Estimation (1)
correctly predicts 84.45% of the 148 observations. Simply predicting that \sole-sourcing
is always used" would correctly predict only 63.5% of the observations, so the estimation
is adding predictive power. This can also be seen by using a likelihood ratio test. This
test compares the maximized value of the log likelihood function of the estimated model,
l, against the maximized value of the restricted log likelihood function, ~ l, where all slope
coe±cients except the constant term are restricted to zero. The Likelihood Ratio (L-R)
test statistic is ¡2(~ l ¡l). Under the joint null hypothesis that all slope coe±cients except
the constant are zero, the L-R statistic is asymptotically distributed as a Â2 variable, with
degrees of freedom equal to thenumberof restrictions(thenumberof independent variables)
underthetest. Forestimation (1), at a signi¯cancelevel of 5%, thecritical value from theÂ2
variablewith 12 degrees of freedom is 5.23. Since the L-Rstatisticis82.4188, thehypothesis
that all coe±cients are jointly zero can be rejected at better than the .001% level.
PREDICTED = 0 PREDICTED = 1
DUALDUM = 0 86 8
DUALDUM = 1 15 39
Table 7: Predicted vs. Actual Values of DUALDUM, Sample Excluding WTA
Turn now to the coe±cients in estimation (1) of Table 6. Hypothesis 1, that dual
sourcing ismorelikely when theincumbent failsto reduce price over time, is not supported.
The coe±cient on FLYRATLG is negative, contrary to what is predicted, and it is not
close to statistically signi¯cant. Hypothesis 2, that dual sourcing is more likely after the
incumbent experiences quality assurance problems, receives strong support. The coe±cient
on PROBLEMS is positive and signi¯cant at betterthan the 1% level. Hypothesis 3, that
dual sourcing is more likely for complex missiles, also receives empirical support, though
COMPLEX is only signi¯cant at the 10% level. Hypothesis 4, that dual sourcing is more
likely in early production periods, is supported at better than the 1% level. This is also
consistent with the negative and signi¯cant coe±cient on QTOGO.
In addition to testing these hypotheses from the literature, several other results emerge
from estimation (1). Controlling for the production period, dual sourcing is more likely
for missiles with greater cumulative production. Presumably such missiles have realized
greater savings from learning, which may be transferable to the second source. Multiyear
contracting makes dual sourcing less likely, supporting the notion that the two institutions
are alternative ways to plug gaps in incomplete procurement contracts. The coe±cient on
FY R is positive and highly signi¯cant, indicating a secular trend toward greateruse of dual
sourcing over time.
20Because probit estimations are highly nonlinear, coe±cients do not directly reveal how
changes in an independent variable a®ect the probability of the dependent variable. Useful
insights into the marginal e®ect of a variable can, however, be obtained by taking partial
derivatives with respect to each variable, holding all variables at their sample means. These
results are presented in Table 8 for estimation (1). For example, complex missiles were
28.3% morelikely to dual sourced than weresimplemissiles. Similarly, an additional quality
control problem increased the likelihood of dual sourcing by 28.4%.
Table 8: Partial Derivatives of E(DUALDUM) for Estimation (1)














Turning to estimation (2), which is restricted to transitionsfrom sole sourcing, it clearly
does not perform as well as (1). As shown in Table 9, it correctly predicts 91.1% of the
101 observations, while simply predicting that \sole sourcing is always used" would predict
90.1% of the observations. The L-R statistic of 18.8092 allows me to reject the hypothesis
that all coe±cients are jointly zero at the 9% level.
PREDICTED = 0 PREDICTED = 1
DUALDUM = 0 91 0
DUALDUM = 1 9 1
Table 9: Predicted vs. Actual Values of DUALDUM, Transitions from Sole Sourcing
Estimation (2) considers only transitions from periods of sole sourcing, which allows
for a cleaner test of the impact of cumulative quality assurance problems, as now all of
21these problems were incurred by the incumbent during periods of sole sourcing. The num-
ber of observations is cut by about a third, however, and statistical power is not as great
as in estimation (1). Nevertheless, results are not greatly di®erent from the previous es-
timation. High prices still have no signi¯cant impact on the use of dual sourcing, while
cumulative quality problems make dual sourcing signi¯cantly more likely. The coe±cient
on COMPLEX is basically unchanged, but it is not statistically signi¯cant in estima-
tion (2). Dual sourcing still appears more likely in early periods of production, especially
when the cumulative production experience is great and the quantity of production units
remaining is lower. Finally, dual sourcing is more likely for missiles with long production
runs.
Estimation (3) focuseson only thosemissiles that experience a switch in sourcing modes
at some point during their production life. This reduces the number of observations to 95.
The estimation correctly predicts 73.7% of the observations, as shown in Table 10, while
a prediction that \solve sourcing is always used" would correctly predict 51.6%. The L-R
statistic of 31.1727 allows me to reject the hypothesis that all coe±cients are jointly zero
at the .2
PREDICTED = 0 PREDICTED = 1
DUALDUM = 0 35 14
DUALDUM = 1 11 35
Table 10: Predicted vs. Actual Values of DUALDUM, Subsample that Switches Sourcing
Modes
I turn now to the government's decision to switch between dual sourcing to a winner-
takes-all auction; all observations of sole sourcing are excluded. The results are presented
in Table 11. The overall predictive power of the model is good. As shown in Table 12, the
model correctly predicts 95% of the observations, while a simple prediction that \winner-
takes-all is never used" would correctly predict only 78.3%. In addition, at a con¯dence
level of 95%, and with ten degrees of freedom, the chi-squared statistic is 3.94, so the joint
hypothesis that all coe±cients are zero can be rejected at better than the .1% level.
A winner-take-all (WTA) auction is used less often for complex missiles and for missiles
with a worse history of quality control problems, though these coe±cients are only signi¯-
cant at betwen the 10% and 12% levels. WTA is signi¯cantly more likely in later periods of
production, as expected. Like dual sourcing, the use of WTA auctions has increased over
time, presumably re°ecting the Defense Department's increasing concern to use competi-
tion in procurement when possible. WTA auctions are less likely for greater cumulative
production levels and for missiles with longer production runs.

























Number of observations 60
L-R Ratio 50.3969
a Signi¯cant beyond the 1% level
b Signi¯cant beyond the 5% level
c Signi¯cant beyond the 10% level
PREDICTED = 0 PREDICTED = 1
DUALDUM = 0 46 1
DUALDUM = 1 2 11
Table 12: Predicted vs. Actual Values of WTADUM, Transitions from Dual Sourcing
23The empirical results in Tables 6,8 and 11 provide numerous insights into the factors
that motivate government use of dual sourcing. I organize my discussion around the ¯ve
theoretical hypotheses identi¯ed earlier.
Hypothesis 1: Dual sourcing is more likely to be used after the incumbent charges a high
price.
The data provides little support for this hypothesis. The key independent variable of
interest is FLYRATLG, which measures the ratio of previous period °yaway cost to that
in the initial period. The hypothesis predicts a positive sign, indicating that incumbents
whose prices do not fall rapidly enough are more likely to face dual sourcing. In Table 6's
estimation (1) the sign is negative, but not signi¯cant; in estimation (2) it is positive but
not signi¯cant. Apparently the rate of price reduction is not an important factor in the
government's decision to dual source.
Hypothesis 2: Dual sourcing is more likely to be used after the incumbent producer delivers
products with quality defects.
This hypothesis receives substantial support. Estimation (1) in Table 6 yieldsa positive
and signi¯cant coe±cient on PROBLEMS, indicating that missiles with more reported
quality problems are more likely to be dual sourced. Table 8 shows that when the inde-
pendent variables are at their means, an additional reported quality problem increases the
likelihood of dual sourcing by roughly 9%. Extrapolating this out for a missile such as
Tomahawk, with 6 reported quality problems, would indicate a 54% greater likelihood of
dual sourcing.
In at least one instance, the trade press reported that the switch from sole to dual
sourcing was a direct result of quality problems: \The U.S. Navy will seek a second pro-
duction source for the Hughes AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air missile after a second round of
inspections determined there were serious quality control problems in producing the mis-
siles. The decision for a second production source was made after a Navy team at Hughes'
Tucson, Ariz., production line recently dismantled and inspected two missiles and found
that problems in producibility and quality control were continuing."20
Hypothesis 3: Dual sourcing is more likely to be used for complex technologies than for
simple ones.
This hypothesis receives strong support in both estimations (1) and (2) of Table 6.
Table 8 shows that on average complex missiles were 28% more likely to experience dual
sourcing than were simple missiles. A related result is that the government is morelikely to
20\Navy Will Seek Second Source for Phoenix," Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 16, 1984, p.
20.
24dual source systems that are undergoing major design changes. In both estimations, DES-
GNDUM enters the regression with a positive coe±cients, although it is only statistically
signi¯cant in (1). The results for both variables support the notion that the buyer expects
greater bene¯ts from competition when there is greater technological uncertainty. This is
also the setting in which contracts are likely to be most incomplete, since technological
speci¯cations may be di±cult to describewith accuracy and detail. Thus, competition may
be to someextent a substitutefor theability to write completecontracts with high-powered
incentives.
Hypothesis 4: Dual sourcing is more likely to be used in the early stages of production.
This hypothesis is closely related to Hypothesis 3, and is also based on the notion that
dual sourcing is morevaluablewhen technological and production cost uncertainty ishigher.
My results provide support for this hypothesis. In both estimations, dual sourcing is more
likely in earlierperiodsof production. Thee®ect is only statistically signi¯cant in estimation
(1), however. Table 8 indicates that, for this estimation, the probability of dual sourcing
declines by about 16% each period.
Hypothesis 5: Dual sourcing is more likely to reduce procurement costs when used for com-
plex technologies.
This hypothesis cannot be tested using the estimations in this section, but it received
scant support from the results in Table 4. There it was shown that the e®ects of dual
sourcing are greater in magnitude and come closer to statistical signi¯cance for complex
missiles, but they are still only signi¯cant at roughly the 20% level. Furthermore, although
the learning curve steepened more for complex missiles, these missiles also su®ered greater
cost increases due to lost scale economies under dual sourcing. Thus, the evidence for
procurement cost savings from dual sourcing is weak, at best, even for complex missiles.
Overall, the results support the notion that dual sourcing is used as a substitute for the
ability to write complete quality-contingent contracts. Dual sourcing is used more often in
the early periods of production for complex technologies or technologies undergoing major
design changes. It is also used in response to observed problems with production quality
by the incumbent producer.
Further evidence on the relation between contractual completeness and competition
can be obtained from the multiyear contracting variable MULTIDUM. Multiyear contracts
are considerably more complete than those that are renegotiated annually, and one might
expect that dual sourcing is less valuable in such a setting. Indeed, the negative and highly
signi¯cant coe±cient on MULTIDUM indicates that dual sourcing is used signi¯cantly less
often when multiyear contracting is employed. This result is complementary to the ¯nding
of Crocker and Reynolds[7] that contracts tend to be less complete when dual sourcing is
25used.
Another important variable a®ecting the decision to dual source if the number of poten-
tial bidders, NUMBID, indicativeof thedegreeof concentration within the defenseindustry.
Its coe±cient is positive and highly statistically signi¯cant in both estimations. Table 8
shows that the presence of one additional bidder increases the probability of dual sourcing
by between 11% and 25%. This ¯nding is consistent with a variety of di®erent hypotheses.
Simple marginal analysis suggests that e±cient procurement policy would make greater use
of supplier switching when more alternative suppliers are available, as the chance of ¯nd-
ing a supplier with lower cost and/or higher quality should increase with the number of
alternatives. At the same time, the ¯nding is consistent with the possibility of government
opportunism, which reduces costs by reducing the rents paid to the incumbent producer,
but also weakens incentives for research and development expenditures in future develop-
ment contracts. Under either interpretation, however, this ¯nding suggests that defense
industry consolidation will a®ect the procurement process by weakening the government's
ability to use dual sourcing.
6 Conclusions
This study is the ¯rst to use panel data to evaluate the performance of dual sourcing as
a contractual instrument in defense procurement. By pooling data from di®erent tactical
missile systems, I was able to test hypotheses that simply cannot be addressed looking at
individual systems in isolation. Furthermore, the hypotheses I consider are drawn from
the recent theoretical literature on second sourcing, and have not, to my knowledge, been
previously subjected to empirical testing.
My results do not support the notion that \competition" (through dual sourcing) will
produce savings to the government. Over the last 15 years, defense procurement policy
has increasingly pressed program o±cers to use dual sourcing whenever possible. The data
indicatethat savings have generally not been achieved from the useof dual sourcing. There
are a number of reasons why dual sourcing may fail to reduce procurement costs: there are
substantial ¯xed costs of transferring technology to the second source, learning-by-doing is
slowed by reducing the production experienceof each individual contractor, scaleeconomies
are lost by splitting production volumes, and split award auctions may facilitate bidding
collusion. I am not able to pin down the relative importance of each of these factors, but
in the aggregate they appear to be enough to nullify any increased cost-reducing e®ort that
may be induced through dual sourcing.
The empirical resultsdo provide fairly strong support for modern theoriesof incomplete
26contracting and bid coordination in split-award auctions. To begin with, the poor perfor-
mance of dual sourcing overall is in line with the predictionsof Riordan and Sappington[13]
and Anton and Yao[1], both of which ¯nd limited scope for dual sourcing to be of value.
Furthermore, theconditions underwhich dual sourcing tendsto beused arealso in line with
theoretical predictions. Consistent with the model of Riordan and Sappington[13], defense
program managers resort to dual sourcing more often when the incumbent has experienced
signi¯cant problems with quality control. Consistent with the model of Anton and Yao[1],
dual sourcing is used more often for complex missile systems, where technological uncer-
tainty undermines the ability of bidders to coordinate their bids to achieve monopolistic
prices in split-award auctions. More generally, incomplete contracting theory predicts that
dual sourcing is most likely to be advantageous during the early phases of production,
when uncertainties of technological and other origin make it impossible to write complete
contracts; these are also the circumstances when collusion in split award auctions is less
likely to be successful. The data indicate that defense program managers are signi¯cantly
more likely to use dual sourcing in these conditions, as predicted, thereby supporting the
notion that problems of incomplete contracting are a signi¯cant reason for the use of dual
sourcing. In addition, defense program managers appear to treat multiyear contracts and
dual sourcing as substitutes, providing further evidence that contractual incompleteness is
an important reason for the use of dual sourcing.
The results reported here focus on the price bene¯ts of competition and do not attempt
to measure contractors' innovation investments, or how they are a®ected by competition.
Rogerson[14] emphasizes that Defense Department policy has traditionally provided incen-
tives for innovation by allowing ¯rms to collect economic pro¯ts during the production
phase of procurement. Introducing competition in production reduces those pro¯ts and
threatens to weaken incentives for research and development. Future research on the con-
nection between dual sourcing of production and innovation performance at the research
and development phase of procurement would be an extremely valuablecomplement to the
work reported here.
References
[1] Anton, James J. and Dennis A. Yao. \Coordination in Split Award Auctions," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, May 1992, pp. 681-707.
[2] Anton, James J. and Dennis A. Yao. (1987) \Second Sourcing and the Experience
Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics,
pp. 57-76.
27[3] Anton, James J. and Dennis A. Yao. (1990) \Measuring the E®ectiveness of Competi-
tion in Defense Procurement: A Survey of theEmpirical Literature," Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, pp. 60-79.
[4] Cabral, Luis M.B. and Michael H. Riordan. (1997) \The Learning Curve, Market
Dominance, and Predatory Pricing," Econometrica, pp. 1115-1140.
[5] Che, Yeon-Koo and Donald R. Hausch. (1999) \CooperativeInvestmentsand theValue
of Contracting," American Economic Review, pp. 125-147.
[6] Cooper, Walter R., Joseph S. Domin, Thomas P. Lyon, Robert M. Feinberg, Jesse
P. Johnson, and David A. Lee. (1997) Empirical Analysis of Cost Progress Curves:
Tactical Missiles. McLean, VA: Logistics Management Institute, May.
[7] Crocker, Keith J. and Kenneth J. Reynolds. (1993) \The E±ciency of Incomplete
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal
of Economics, pp. 126-146.
[8] Demski, Joel S., David E.M. Sappington, and Pablo T. Spiller. \Managing Supplier
Switching," RAND Journal of Economics, pp. 77-97.
[9] Hausman, Jerry A. (1978) \Speci¯cation Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, v. 46,
pp. 1251-1271.
[10] Kovacic, William E. and Dennis E. Smallwood. (1994) \Competition Policy, Rivalries,
and Defense Industry Consolidation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 91-110.
[11] Kratz, L.A., J.W. Drinnon and J.R. Hiller. (1984) Establishing Competitive Produc-
tion Sources: A Handbook for Program Managers. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems
Management College.
[12] La®ont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[13] Riordan, Michael H. and David E. M. Sappington. (1989) \Second Sourcing," RAND
Journal of Economics, pp. 41-58.
[14] Rogerson, William P. (1989) \Pro¯t Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for
Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1284-1305.
28